National identity
Exploring Britishness

The chapter explores how people think about 'Britishness' and the importance of factors such as languge, ancestry and residence. Do you have to be born British, or can Britishness be aquired over time? It starts by considering whether views on these issues have changed since 1995, when the survey first covered this topic. It then examines whether the way people think about British identity relates to their wider views about how Britain should interact with the outside world, focusing on attitudes to immigration, trade and the European Union.

What makes a person 'truly British'?

The most common view is that a mixture of 'civic' factors (which can be acquired over time – for example, speaking English) and 'ethnic' ones (which are largely determined early on in life – for example, being born in Britain) shape whether someone can be considered British. The majority (63%) think both matter, while 31% think that only civic factors are important.



In a number of cases the threshold to being considered British has got higher. A near unanimous 95% think that being able to speak English is important for being 'truly British', up from 85% in 1995.



24% think being Christian is important, down from 32% in 1995, no doubt reflecting the decline in religious faith in Britain since 1995.

Britain and the rest of the world

The way people think about Britishness is strongly linked to the way they think about Britain's relationship with the rest of the world.

WHO HAS THE MOST BRITAIN-FOCUSED VIEW?



Of those who see Britishness as determined by both ethnic and civic factors, 25% take a very 'Britain-focused' view about how the country should deal with international organisations and foreign trade. This compares with 4% of those who think civic factors alone determine whether someone is British.

WHO HAS THE MOST EUROSCEPTIC VIEW?



36% of people who emphasise ethnic and civic factors are very Eurosceptic, compared with 15% of those who think it is civic factors alone that make a person British.

Introduction

Authors

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Earlier this year NatCen released initial findings from the 2013 British Social Attitudes survey that showed a decline in people's pride in being British, with a particular fall in the proportion who say they are "very proud", from 43 per cent in 2003 to 35 per cent now (Young, 2014). This change has taken place across much of British society and it is only those who were the most fiercely proud in 2003, the over 65s and the least well educated, whose views remain unchanged. In this chapter we develop this discussion by focusing on the very concept of 'Britishness' and what people think it means. Is it a question of language, ancestry or residence? Do you have to be born British, or can Britishness be acquired over time?

We last tackled this issue in our 21st Report which included a chapter about British national identity, based on findings from the 2003 survey (Tilley et al., 2004). The authors examined whether it was helpful to classify people in Britain according to whether they saw national identity as being based on 'civic' factors (such as residence or citizenship) or 'ethnic' ones (such as ancestry). They found that people's views fell into different camps, but that the largest group was those who think both ethnic and civic factors matter when thinking about whether a person can be considered "truly British".

Of course, much has changed since 2003. We might expect views about Britishness to have been affected by events as diverse as the Iraq war, the 2012 Olympics, immigration from Eastern Europe (following the accession of eight countries to the EU in 2004), the global financial crisis that began in 2007 and debates about increasing foreign ownership of previously British organisations and assets (for example, the takeover bid by Pfizer for UK drugs firm AstraZeneca).

So, ten years later, this chapter starts by revisiting how Britain thinks about national identity and how this has changed since 2003. It then investigates attitudes to immigration and Britain's relationship both with the outside world in general, and with the EU in particular, to see how these issues relate to the way we think about what it means to be British. To do this we use data from a set of questions developed as part of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and included on the British Social Attitudes surveys in 1995, 2003 and 2013.

The concept of national identity

There are two widely accepted conceptions of nationality: 'ethnic' and 'civic'

There are two widely accepted conceptions of nationality: 'ethnic' and 'civic', both of which are linked to the development of nations and states in Europe. The **civic** conception of nationalism helps explain the development of nations in states that had already emerged as political and geographical units (for example, France). As such, the nation was defined as the totality of people living within the boundaries of that state and abiding by its laws. This is why in the French conception of nationalism the words 'nationality' and 'citizenship' denote the same thing: belonging to the French state. Indeed, in the civic conception of nationalism, the nation and the citizenry are one and the same, which is why such states are often referred to as nation states. Consequently, when we think of national identity in civic terms, we think of an inclusive form of identity: a person associates themselves with the citizenry and the political

When we think of ethnic nationalism, traditions, language, religion and ancestry are precisely the things that matter

and legal institutions of the state. His or her identity is defined by attachment to the state as embodied by its institutions and rules and not by traditions, language or religion. Conversely, when we think of **ethnic** nationalism, traditions, language, religion and ancestry are precisely the things that matter. As opposed to the civic nation, the ethnic conception of nationalism came into existence in Germany and Eastern Europe as a response of communities in highly fragmented societies (such as the Austro-Hungarian empire) searching to define themselves. While civic nationalism emerged after, and as a response to, the emergence of a physical state, ethnic nationalism emerged and solidified culturally distinct communities who were looking to form their own state. This is why in nation states where the ethnic conception of nationalism dominates there is a clear distinction between citizenship and nationality. Citizenship denotes a person's legal status vis-à-vis the state; nationality denotes his or her intrinsic identity. Ethnic national identity is characterised by an attachment to one's ancestry, tradition, culture and language – and not necessarily to the state a person was born and lives in. This is why an ethnic national identity is exclusive: if you are not born into it, you cannot acquire it (Ignatieff, 1995).

This discussion assumes a very clear distinction between the two types of national identity. While this is accurate in certain circumstance and some states neatly fit into one or other category (for example, France and Germany), the picture in the UK is more complicated. Tilley et al., (2004) cite Cohen (1994) who describes Britishness as being a 'fuzzy' concept that cannot be readily placed into either of these two buckets. As such, they propose a matrix within which these two types of national identity intersect with one another, producing four possible types of national identity. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1. Their analysis of the 1995 and 2003 ISSP data suggests that most people in Britain think of national identity in a way which combines both ethnic **and** civic dimensions.

Figure 4.1 The two dimensions of national identity



Defining British identity

We assessed how people think of national identity by asking the following questions as part of the 1995, 2003 and 2013 British Social Attitudes surveys:

> *Some people say that the following things are important for being truly British. Others say that they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?*
>
> *To have been born in Britain*
> *To have British citizenship*
> *To have lived in Britain for most of one's life*
> *To be able to speak English*
> *To be a Christian*
> *To respect Britain's political institutions and laws*
> *To feel British*
> *To have British ancestry*

We asked an additional question to assess the extent to which shared customs and traditions matter:

> *Now we would like to ask a few questions about minority groups in Britain. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? It is impossible for people who do not share Britain's customs and traditions to become fully British*

95%
think being able to speak English is important for being "truly British"

Table 4.1 shows the results. Of the nine attributes we asked about, six are seen as "very" or "fairly" important by around three-quarters of people or more. The most important factor is being able to speak English (which 95 per cent think is important), followed by having British citizenship and respecting Britain's political institutions and laws (both 85 per cent). Around three-quarters think being born in Britain is important, but only half that having British ancestry matters. It is notable that only a quarter think that being Christian is important for being "truly British".

If we look at the data from a historical perspective, it is clear that, despite little change between 1995 and 2003, there have been some major shifts since then. In particular, the perceived importance of being able to speak English has increased by nearly ten percentage points. There has also been an increase in the proportion who think it important that someone has lived for most of their life in Britain, up from 69 per cent in 2003 to 77 per cent now.

Table 4.1 Importance of different attributes for being "truly British", 1995–2013

% saying "very important" or "fairly important"	1995	2003	2013	Change: 1995 to 2003	Change: 2003 to 2013
Ability to speak English	85	86	95	1 pp	9 pp
Having British citizenship	83	83	85	0 pp	2 pp
Respecting institutions/laws	82	82	85	0 pp	3 pp
Feel British	73	74	78	1 pp	5 pp
Live life in Britain	71	69	77	-2 pp	8 pp
Been born in Britain	76	70	74	-6 pp	4 pp
Have British ancestry	n/a	46	51	n/a	5 pp
Sharing customs/traditions*	50	52	50	2 pp	-2 pp
Be a Christian	32	31	24	-1 pp	-7 pp
Weighted base	*1079*	*881*	*894*		
Unweighted base	*1058*	*873*	*904*		

** For this question the table shows the per cent who "strongly agree" or "agree"*

To understand how these results correspond to the two identity dimensions we mentioned earlier (ethnic versus civic) we used a technique called factor analysis (for more information about factor analysis please see the Technical details chapter). The results of this analysis are provided in the Appendix to this chapter and show that responses to the questions in Table 4.1 do indeed divide into two different dimensions, which correspond well with the differences between ethnic and civic conceptions of national identity. These are shown in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2 National and civic dimensions of being British

Ethnic dimension	Civic dimension
To have been born in Britain	To have British citizenship
To have lived in Britain for most of one's life	To be able to speak English
To be a Christian	To respect Britain's political institutions and laws
To have British ancestry	
To share customs and traditions	

We then calculated an ethnic identity score and a civic identity score for each respondent, based on how they had answered these questions.[1] In each case, the closer the score is to 5, the more weight that person puts on the relevant dimension of national identity, and the closer it is to 0, the less weight. The results, presented in Table 4.3, show that the vast majority of Britons do not see whether or not someone is "truly British" as being down to solely civic or ethnic criteria – instead, many see both as playing a role. Those in this category can be found in the bottom right hand quadrant of Table 4.3. Another, smaller, group have an entirely civic view of national identity (they are in the top right hand quadrant). Almost nobody has an entirely ethnic view (bottom left hand quadrant). Finally, there is also evidence of a group whose views about national identity have neither an ethnic nor a civic component (top left hand quadrant).

Table 4.3 Distribution of scores (%) on the ethnic and civic national identity scales

		Civic national identity			
		2 or less	**2.01–3**	**3.01–4**	**4.01–5**
Ethnic national identity	**2 or less**	*	3	4	5
	2.01–3	*	2	8	17
	3.01–4	0	*	8	27
	4.01–5	0	0	3	21

Base: 868

** = less than 1%*

The majority of people attach importance to both ethnic and civic aspects of national identity

These results are summarised in Table 4.4. It shows that the majority of people (nearly two thirds) attach importance to both ethnic and civic aspects of national identity while about one third tend to think of national identity only in civic terms. Six per cent do not appear to think of national identity in either ethnic or civic terms. Comparing these findings with those from earlier years shows considerable continuity, although there is the hint of a small increase in the proportion of the population with a civic notion of national identity, from 23 per cent in 1995 to 34 per cent in 2003 and 31 per cent in 2013.[2] There has also been a small change in the proportion who think that both civic and ethnic aspects of national identity matter: after a 4 percentage point dip between 1995 and 2003, by 2013 this proportion had returned to its 1995 level of 63 per cent.

Table 4.4 Distribution of conceptions of national identity, 1995, 2003 and 2013

	1995	**2003**	**2013**	**2003 and 2013 combined**
	%	%	%	%
Civic and ethnic	63	59	63	61
Only civic	23	34	31	32
Neither civic nor ethnic	13	7	6	7
Weighted base	*–*	*807*	*863*	*1670*
Unweighted base	*961*	*791*	*868*	*1659*

Results for 1995 are taken from Tilley et al., (2004)

Of course, these overall findings are likely to mask considerable differences between particular groups. An obvious starting point here is age; we know from earlier work that there are clear age differences in national pride, with younger groups being less likely than older ones to express pride in being British (Young, 2014). We explore this in Table 4.5. However, rather than focusing on age, we examine the views of specific generations as there are strong reasons to suspect that their different experiences during their formative years (particularly in terms of their exposure to war and conflict) will have had an impact on the way they think about Britain and British identity.

To do this we pooled together our 2003 and 2013 findings (to increase the sample size available for analysis) and then allocated people into one of three different generational groups: those born before 1945; those born between 1945 and 1964; and those born after 1964. The results show that there are

indeed considerable generational differences; nearly nine in ten of the pre-1945 generation have a civic and ethnic view of British national identity, but the same is only true of six in ten of those born between 1945 and 1964, falling to five in ten among the youngest generation. Conversely, while 40 per cent of those born after 1964 have a view of British national identity based only on civic factors, this is true of just 13 per cent of those born before 1945.

40%

of those born after 1964 have a view of British national identity based only on civic factors

Table 4.5 Distribution of conceptions of national identity, by generation, 2003 and 2013

	Born pre-1945	Born 1945–1964	Born post-1964
	%	%	%
Civic and ethnic	86	61	50
Only civic	13	33	40
Neither civic nor ethnic	2	5	10
Weighted base	*341*	*591*	*737*
Unweighted base	*408*	*588*	*663*

These findings suggest that, over time, the importance attached to ascribed ethnic factors in thinking about national identity may well decline, as older generations die out and are replaced by generations who are less likely to think of Britishness as dependent on factors such as birth, ancestry and sharing customs and traditions.

National identity and attitudes to immigration

Since our last detailed look at this topic, immigration has become an issue of huge public concern. As Rob Ford and Anthony Heath discuss in the Immigration chapter, widespread public anxieties about migration levels and the impact of new arrivals in Britain mean that a large majority would like to see immigration levels reduced. Might immigration explain some of the changes we have found in what people think matters when it comes to being British, and particularly the rise in the importance attached to being able to speak English?

In this section we examine how people's views about immigration relate to the way they think and feel about national identity. We do this by focusing on a set of questions about immigration, which we introduce to respondents as follows:

> *There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in Britain. (By 'immigrants' we mean people who come to settle in Britain). How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?*

Table 4.6 shows the precise question wording of each statement. The findings are mixed and show that opinions on immigration have shifted in both a positive and negative direction over the last ten years. However, the largest change is in a negative direction and relates to people's attitude towards whether legal immigrants should have the same rights as British citizens. In 2013 only 27 per cent of people agree with this statement, down from 40 per cent in 2003.

Table 4.6 Attitudes towards immigration, 2003–2013

% agree that	2003	2013	Change: 2003 to 2013
Immigrants increase crime rates	37	43	6 pp
Immigrants are generally good for Britain's economy	21	32	11 pp
Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Britain	43	50	7 pp
Immigrants improve British society by bringing new ideas and cultures	33	40	7 pp
Legal immigrants to Britain who are not citizens should have the same rights as British citizens	40	27	-13 pp
Britain should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants	80	82	2 pp
Weighted base	*881*	*894*	
Unweighted base	*873*	*904*	

Those who think national identity has at least some ethnic element are more likely to be opposed to immigration

To help our analysis we created a summary measure of attitudes towards immigration for each respondent, based on their responses to the questions in Table 4.6.[3] The results are shown in Table 4.7 and confirm there is a clear relationship between a person's stance on immigration and what they think matters when it comes to determining whether someone is "truly British". In general, those who think national identity has at least some ethnic element are more likely to be opposed to immigration; a third (34 per cent) fall into the most anti-immigration category, compared with just 7 per cent of those whose view of national identity emphasizes civic factors alone.

Table 4.7 Attitudes towards immigration, by attitudes towards national identity, 2003–2013

	Ethnic and civic		Only civic		Neither		All	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	2003	**2013**	**2003**	**2013**	**2003**	**2013**	**2003**	**2013**
Most anti-immigration	30	34	7	7	12	10	21	24
|	57	54	42	37	46	44	51	48
||	13	12	45	52	39	40	25	26
Most pro-immigration	*	1	6	4	2	6	2	2
Weighted base	*430*	*508*	*243*	*246*	*49*	*49*	*722*	*802*
Unweighted base	*438*	*542*	*219*	*224*	*48*	*43*	*705*	*809*

** = less than 1%.*

To tease out the relationship between views about immigration and national identity we carried out multivariate logistic regression to identify the factors that are significantly associated with whether someone has an ethic and civic view of national identity (as opposed to one that has no ethnic element at all). We included a large set of other variables in our model, including age, sex, education, occupation, religion, country and parental citizenship, as well as respondents' underlying libertarian-authoritarian, left-right economic values and whether they think that 'feeling British' is an important factor in being British. Further details of this technique can be found in the Technical details

section of the report, and the full results of our analysis are shown in the Appendix to this chapter. The findings confirm that a person's views about immigration are significantly related to whether they see British national identity as having an ethnic as well as a civic component. A number of other factors also matter. As we would expect from our earlier generational analysis, older people, the less educated and those who identify with the Church of England are more likely to have an ethnic and civic view of national identity. So too are workers in clerical, routine non-manual jobs or in working class occupations when compared to those in professional and managerial jobs (the 'salariat'). Those who think that "feeling British" is an important aspect of "being truly British" are also more likely to see national identity in ethnic and civic terms. Finally, there is also an association between having an authoritarian mindset (as opposed to a libertarian one) and thinking of national identity in ethnic terms. Unsurprisingly, people whose parents were not UK citizens are less likely to think of national identity in ethnic terms.

The increase in the proportion of people who see national identity as comprising both ethnic and civic elements is confined to those who are opposed to immigration

In the previous section we showed that the most common view is that "being truly British" has both an ethnic and a civic component. We have now seen that people's attitudes towards immigration are associated with the way they think about national identity, even when factors such as age and class are taken into account. Table 4.8 develops this further by looking at how views about Britishness have changed among groups with different views about immigration. Because of the small sample sizes at the pro-immigration end of our scale, here we focus on three groups only: the quarter (24 per cent in 2013) who are most opposed to immigration; the half (48 per cent in 2013) who are less opposed but sceptical about immigration; and the remaining quarter (28 per cent) who adopt a more pro-immigration view. The table shows that the increase in the proportion of people who see national identity as comprising both ethnic and civic elements is confined to those who are opposed to immigration – up from 84 per cent to 89 per cent among those with the most anti-immigration views and from 66 per cent to 71 per cent among the half of the population who are moderately opposed to immigration. There has been no statistically significant change among those who are more pro-immigration, a group who are far less likely to think that ethnic characteristics matter when it comes to whether or not someone is "truly British".

Table 4.8 Attitudes towards national identity, by attitudes towards immigration, 2003–2013

	Most anti-immigration		Anti-immigration		Immigration friendly		Total	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	2003	**2013**	**2003**	**2013**	**2003**	**2013**	**2003**	**2013**
Ethnic and civic identity	84	89	66	71	29	29	60	63
Civic only identity	12	9	28	24	61	61	34	31
Neither ethnic nor civic identity	4	2	6	6	10	10	7	6
Weighted base	*151*	*193*	*370*	*384*	*201*	*225*	*722*	*802*
Unweighted base	*154*	*204*	*361*	*397*	*190*	*208*	*705*	*809*

What can we take from these findings? They certainly show that views about immigration are closely associated with how people think about what it means to be British. But they also suggest that changing views about what it is to

be British (and specifically the small increase we have found in the proportion who think that both ethnic and civic factors matter) cannot necessarily be explained by changing attitudes towards immigration, as since 2003 attitudes to immigration have remained fairly stable. However, the fact the increase in the proportion of those who think that ethnic and civic factors matter has happened entirely among those with a negative view about immigration is noteworthy.

National identity and internationalism

We turn now to examine what people think about Britain's relationship with the outside world and, in particular, the extent to which there is support for Britain adopting measures to 'protect' itself from external threats. These are timely questions. Few weeks go by without this issue hitting the news; the example at the time of writing being Pfizer's attempted takeover of AstraZeneca in spring 2014, as well as ongoing debates about the role of foreign-owned firms in Britain's energy market, the globalisation of the English Premier League, and the impact of foreign ownership on London's housing market.

We can assess public opinion on this issue by looking at responses to the set of questions described in Table 4.9. Overall, nearly six in ten think that international companies are increasingly damaging local businesses, and a similar proportion think they take away power from the British government. Just under half express support for limiting imports to protect the British economy. Far fewer however support banning foreigners from buying land or giving preference to British films and programmes on British television. It is also notable that opinion has softened since 2003; the two questions associated with the highest agreement in 2013 are down by between 6 and 8 points on their 2003 readings, both in an internationalist direction.

53%

think international organisations are taking away too much power from the British government

Table 4.9 Attitudes towards internationalism, 2003–2013

% agree that …	2003	2013	Change: 2003 to 2013
Britain should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy	56	48	-8 pp
Britain should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations	46	46	0 pp
Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in Britain	28	27	-1 pp
Britain's television should give preference to British films and programmes	29	27	-2 pp
Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in Britain	62	56	-6 pp
International organisations are taking away too much power from the British government	52	53	1 pp
Weighted base	*881*	*894*	
Unweighted base	*873*	*904*	

We used factor analysis to check that all these questions measure the same underling concept and then used them to create a summary measure of 'internationalism'.[4] In this summary measure a value of 1 means a person who is entirely focused on Britain while a value of 4 indicates someone who is very internationally minded. Table 4.10 shows the relationship between a person's views about Britishness and how they feel about Britain's place in the world. In

2013, but also in 2003, we see that those who think ethnic elements matter when it comes to British national identity are by far the most likely to be Britain-focused in their outlook on the world; 25 per cent fall into this category, compared with just 4 per cent of those who have a civic view of national identity.

Table 4.10 Attitudes towards internationalism, by attitudes towards national identity, 2003–2013

	Ethnic and civic		Only civic		Neither		All	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	2003	**2013**	**2003**	**2013**	**2003**	**2013**	**2003**	**2013**
More Britain-focused	30	25	8	4	3	5	21	18
|	56	60	49	44	46	48	53	55
||	13	15	39	47	44	43	24	26
More internationally minded	*	*	5	5	7	4	2	2
Weighted base	*414*	*496*	*232*	*219*	*50*	*45*	*696*	*761*
Unweighted base	*417*	*531*	*211*	*207*	*48*	*39*	*676*	*777*

** = less than 1%*

People whose view of national identity is entirely civic are considerably more likely to be internationally orientated

To look at these relationships in more depth we, once again, relied on multivariate regression analysis and tried to identify the key predictors of a person's view about internationalism. The results are presented in the Appendix to this chapter and show that while controlling for all other characteristics, people whose view of national identity is entirely civic are considerably more likely to be internationally oriented than those who take an ethnic and civic view of identity.[5] The regression also shows that, while controlling for a range of other factors (including identity), those who think that "feeling British" is important for "being truly British" are less likely to be internationally minded. Internationalism also increases with the level of education received.

National identity and the EU

Perhaps the most relevant current example of internationalism relates to people's openness towards the EU. In the previous section we saw that those with an ethnic component to their sense of British identity are less international in their outlook; what do this group make of Europe? We assess this by using responses to the three following questions:

> *Generally speaking, would you say that Britain benefits or does not benefit from being a member of the European Union?*
>
> *Britain should follow European Union decisions, even if it does not agree with them?*
>
> *Generally, do you think that the European Union should have ... much more, more, as much, less, or much less power than the national governments of its member states?*

Overall just one in five (21 per cent) think that Britain "greatly" or "largely" benefits from EU membership, while 15 per cent think Britain should follow all EU decisions. Only six per cent think that the EU should have more power than

the national governments of its member states. Factor analysis shows the three questions reliably measure the same underlying concept, so we used them to create a summary scale with, at one end, what we will call the 'Eurosceptics' and, at the other, the 'Europhiles'.[6] The results are shown in Table 4.11, which shows that those who think of national identity in ethnic and civic terms are twice as likely as those who see it in civic only terms to be at the most Eurosceptic end of the scale (36 and 15 per cent respectively).

Table 4.11 Attitudes towards the EU, by attitudes towards national identity, 2013

	Ethnic and civic	Only civic	Neither	Total
	%	%	%	%
Europhile	*	5	14	3
|	15	39	34	24
||	48	39	35	44
Eurosceptic	36	15	16	29
Weighted base	*387*	*210*	*35*	*633*
Unweighted base	*416*	*187*	*31*	*634*

** = less than 1%*

Those who see British national identity in solely civic terms are far less likely to be Eurosceptics

We also carried out regression to check whether these findings hold true once other factors such as age and education are taken into account. The results are presented in the Appendix and confirm that a person's views about national identity are associated with their views about Europe, in the direction suggested by Table 4.11. Those who see British national identity in solely civic terms are far less likely to be Eurosceptics than those who see identity as having both ethnic and civic components. Once more the results also show that Euroscepticism is less likely among those with higher levels of education.

Conclusions

This chapter set out to examine how British identity is constructed and what relationships exist between the way someone thinks about identity and their attitudes towards the world beyond the UK's borders. We began by showing that people can be divided into three different groups when it comes to what they think makes a person "truly British". First, there are those who see being British as depending on both civic and ethnic considerations. For this group, being British is dependent on attributes one can achieve (such as speaking English) as well as on those which are largely ascribed (such as being born in Britain). This group is by far the largest, accounting for nearly two thirds (63 per cent) of the population. Second, we have a considerably smaller group (31 per cent) who think of British identity only in terms of civic factors and do not see ethnic ones as important. Finally, there is a very small group (six per cent) who seemingly do not see identity as either depending on ethnic or civic considerations.

The relative size of these groups has not changed markedly since the mid-1990s. However, there have been two small shifts; an increase since 1995 in the proportion of people who take a 'civic only' view of British national identity, and a small rise since 2003 in the proportion who think that both civic and ethnic factors matter. These two changes are likely to be shaped by quite different pressures. The first is likely to reflect, at least partly, the fact that younger generations are more

likely than older ones to hold a civic view of Britishness. Younger generations are less likely than their elders to think that ascribed factors such as being born in Britain, being Christian or having British ancestry matter in determining whether or not someone is 'really' British. Consequently, as older generations die out, we would expect to see a gradual increase in the proportion of people who think that only civic, and not ethnic, factors matter. By contrast, the increase since 2003 in the proportion who think that civic and ethnic factors matter is likely to reflect some of the key events of the last decade; the fact that this increase has only occurred among those with negative views about immigration hints that the two might be linked. Changing patterns of immigration may also help explain the considerable increase in the proportion of people who think that speaking English is an important determining factor in whether or not someone can be considered "truly British" (95 per cent see this as an important factor).

Perhaps not surprisingly, the way people think about Britishness is strongly linked to the way they think about Britain's relationship with the rest of the world. Those who think that both ethnic and civic factors determine whether someone is British are far more likely than others to want Britain to 'protect' itself from international trade, are more opposed to immigration, and would like to see Britain have fewer ties with the European Union. It is not possible to be clear about the causal link that underpins this relationship, but it is clear that the way people think about who 'really' belongs within modern Britain is closely linked to the way they think about Britain's place in the world and their views about how open it should be to external influences. How this will change over time is not clear. As is the case in the Immigration chapter, by Rob Ford and Anthony Heath, this is another area characterised by a tension between the longer term trends that we might expect to see as a result of gradual generational change, and more unpredictable and shorter term responses to political and social events. Given the success of UKIP in the European elections in June, this tension looks likely to remain for some time.

As older generations die out, we would expect to see a gradual increase in the proportion of people who think that only civic, and not ethnic, factors matter

Notes

1. To obtain each score we added up (summed) the values of the respective variables and then divided the resulting number by the number of questions, to produce a scale from 1 to 5.
2. Caution should be taken when comparing the 1995 results with those for subsequent years as the construction of the national identity variable in that year was slightly different to the formulation used in 2003 and 2013. Specifically, it did not include "being Christian" but did include "feeling British".
3. The scaled variable was obtained by adding up (summing) the values of the six questions for each respondent, having first reversed the order of the second and fourth questions in Table 4.6 so that for each question agreement indicated an anti-immigration position. The results were divided by 6 to obtain a scale which varies between 1 and 5.
4. The summary variable was computed in the same way as is described in note 3 above.
5. Intriguingly, those whose conception of national identity is neither civic nor ethnic are even more likely to be internationally minded, supporting the conclusion that it is indeed seeing the ethnic component of Britishness as important that is more closely linked to being British-focused.
6. The summary variable was computed in the same way as is described in note 3 above.

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Appendix

Table A.1 Factor analysis of dimension of British identity: scores for maximum likelihood factor analysis with varimax rotation

	Ethnic dimension	Civic dimension
To have been born in Britain	.704	.200
To have British citizenship	.377	.451
To have lived in Britain for most of one's life	.573	.376
To be able to speak English	.255	.606
To be a Christian	.501	.152
To respect Britain's political institutions and laws	.041	.494
To have British ancestry	.812	.142
To share customs and traditions	.456	.121
Weighted base		*1670*

Table A.2 Logistic regression. Dependent variable: ethnic identity versus other

	Odds ratio	Standard error	P value
Anti-immigration	3.165**	0.484	0.000
Importance of feeling British for being British	1.363**	0.086	0.000
Gender: female	1.200	0.200	0.273
2013 compared to 2003	1.021	0.018	0.253
Clerical compared to salariat	1.835*	0.466	0.017
Petty bourgeois compared to salariat	2.294*	0.804	0.018
Foremen/technicians compared to salariat	1.775*	0.477	0.033
Working class compared to salariat	1.550*	0.352	0.054
Race: non-white	0.482	0.228	0.123
Age	2.270**	0.384	0.000
Birth cohort	1.375	0.233	0.061
Education	0.863*	0.060	0.035
Catholic compared to non-religious	1.109	0.296	0.699
Christian/Protestant compared to non-religious	1.414	0.306	0.110
Church of England compared to non-religious	1.978*	0.456	0.003
Non-Christian compared to non-religious	0.505	0.272	0.205
Wales compared to England	1.238	0.462	0.567
Scotland compared to England	0.864	0.213	0.554
Libertarian – authoritarian	1.648**	0.227	0.000
Left – right	0.946	0.099	0.592
Parents non-citizens	0.498*	0.175	0.048
Intercept	0.000	0.000	0.168
Pseudo R^2			*0.318*
Weighted base			*1374*

**= significant at 95% level **= significant at 99% level*

Table A.3 OLS regression results. Dependent variable: internationalism

	OLS coefficient	Standard error	P value
Importance of feeling British for being British	-0.064**	0.016	0.000
National identity – civic only (compared to ethnic and civic)	0.356**	0.045	0.000
National identity – neither civic nor ethnic (compared to ethnic and civic)	0.358**	0.083	0.000
Gender: female	0.052	0.039	0.174
2013 compared to 2003	0.000	0.004	0.970
Clerical compared to salariat	-0.083	0.053	0.119
Petty bourgeois compared to salariat	-0.100	0.084	0.236
Foremen/technicians compared to salariat	-0.183*	0.062	0.003
Working class compared to salariat	-0.142*	0.052	0.007
Race: non-white	-0.149	0.091	0.101
Age	0.028	0.035	0.429
Birth cohort	0.074	0.039	0.059
Education	0.121**	0.015	0.000
Catholic compared to non-religious	0.025	0.063	0.688
Christian/Protestant compared to non-religious	-0.118*	0.052	0.023
Church of England compared to non-religious	-0.090	0.050	0.068
Non-Christian compared to non-religious	0.033	0.111	0.766
In work	-0.138	0.086	0.106
Wales compared to England	0.068	0.057	0.234
Scotland compared to England	0.180*	0.077	0.019
Parents non-citizens	2.588	7.919	0.744
Intercept	-0.064**	0.016	0.000
R^2			*0.308*
Weighted base			*1335*

**= significant at 95% level **= significant at 99% level*

Table A.4 OLS regression results. Dependent variable: euroscepticism

	OLS coefficient	Standard error	P value
National identity – civic only (compared to ethnic and civic)	-0.331**	0.085	0.000
National identity – neither civic nor ethnic (compared to ethnic and civic)	-0.451	0.242	0.063
Importance of feeling British for being British	0.010	0.038	0.798
Gender: female	-0.074	0.073	0.310
Clerical compared to salariat	0.095	0.113	0.401
Petty bourgeois compared to salariat	-0.199	0.158	0.206
Foremen/technicians compared to salariat	-0.020	0.109	0.857
Working class compared to salariat	-0.049	0.114	0.669
Race: non-white	0.233	0.205	0.258
Age	-0.022	0.071	0.752
Birth cohort	-0.110	0.076	0.151
Education	-0.116**	0.031	0.000
Catholic compared to non-religious	0.215*	0.111	0.054
Christian/Protestant compared to non-religious	0.030	0.086	0.728
Church of England compared to non-religious	-0.016	0.087	0.853
Non-Christian compared to non-religious	-0.385	0.248	0.122
Wales compared to England	0.003	0.163	0.986
Scotland compared to England	-0.101	0.118	0.391
Left – right	-0.212	0.148	0.153
Parents non-citizens	4.481**	0.403	0.000
Intercept	-0.331**	0.085	0.000
R^2			*0.196*
Weighted base			*569*

**= significant at 95% level **= significant at 99% level*